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Abstract 
The puzzle of international society has long occupied International Relations (IR) 
theory, but it lends itself to a clearer articulation in legal positivist theory. On strict 
legal positivist terms, international society is defined as a compact of legal equals, 
states. However if states claim to belong to a social order they ought to recognise a 
common authority.  Authority is a form of hierarchy—‘authoritative’ means ‘one that 
cannot be overridden’, ‘one of a higher standing’. The paradox of international society 
then is this: state relations are organised horizontally and each state is seen as 
independent from other states, but at the same time these relations seem to be 
organised hierarchically because each state is dependent on an authority other than its 
own.  As I argue, the crux of the matter depends on clarifying where authority resides, 
not who holds it. After discussing authority in political theory (Jean Bodin, Thomas 
Hobbes, Carl Schmitt, Giorgio Agamben), the essay goes on to articulate a concept of 
international authority compatible with an equality-of-states principle.  Crucially, this 
concept rests on what I call ‘rule-based legal positivism’ traceable to the writings of 
H.L.A. Hart. The question of international authority thus invites us to attend to the 
conversation of three traditions: IR theory, political theory, and legal theory. 
 
 
Keywords: law, institutions, internationalism, normative political theory, rule of law, 
sovereignty  
 
                                                 





From the standpoint of mainstream IR theory, the problem of international order is a 
standing one because international life is assumed to take place in a condition of 
‘anarchy’ or in the absence of a common superior.
∗ Yet, this does not rule out the 
possibility of ordering state relations either through: (1) empire or hegemony 
(whereby the assumption of anarchy is rejected); or (2) international society (where 
the assumption of anarchy is endorsed).
2 This essay explores the second possibility by 
asking whether order can emerge within anarchy.
3 ‘Order’ refers to an intelligent 
arrangement which reflects the workings of human thought and choice, not a natural 
arrangement produced by natural forces.
4  Invoking the classical Roman stipulation 
that ‘where there is society, there is law’ (ubi societas, ibi jus), I define order as law 
thereby redirecting the discussion from IR theory to legal theory.  
A legal perspective is adopted for two reasons. First, the term society is 
ambiguous for it connotes an indiscriminate array of relations: political, economic, 
cultural, military, and so on. But all those relations have a legal element. Using law as 
                                                 
∗ I wish to thank Terry Nardin, the editors, and two anonymous reviewers for comments and criticisms 
for improving this paper. All remaining errors are my own.  
2 The tradition of international society is associated with early modern writers such as Hugo Grotius, 
Emmerich de Vattel, Samuel von Pufendorf, and more recently with mostly UK-based academics 
referred to as the ‘English School’. See Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace [De jure belli et 
pacis], tr. Francis W. Kelsey, 3 vols (New York: Oceana, 1964 [1646]); Samuel von Pufendorf, Eight 
Books on the Laws of Nature and Nations [De jure naturae et gentium libri octo], tr. C. H. and W. A. 
Oldfather (New York: Oceana, 1964 [1688]); Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the 
Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns [Le 
droit des gens, ou principes de la loi naturelle appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des 
souverains], tr. from the French, no translator specified (Northampton, Mass.: Thomas M. Pomroy for 
S. E. Butler, 1805 [1758]); The identity of the English School is a matter of scholarly debate. Its first 
generation members include Herbert Butterfield, Hedley Bull, Adam Watson, and Martin Wight. See 
Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of 
International Politics (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966); Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study 
of Order in World Politics, 3rd edn (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2002 [1977]); Hedley Bull and Adam 
Watson (eds), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Adam 
Watson, Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States (London: Eyre Methuen, 1982); Adam Watson, The 
Evolution of International Society:  A Comparative Historical Analysis (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1992); Martin Wight, Power Politics, 2nd edn, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986 [1946]); Martin Wight, System of States, ed. Hedley Bull (Leicester: 
Leicester University Press, 1977). 
3 The main argument of Bull’s Anarchical Society is that the condition of anarchy in the international 
realm does not necessarily lead to self-help but admits of order and rules.  
4 Herbert Butterfield defines the balance of power as a human understanding, as ‘a precept, about 
which one can have a certain option—an injunction to behave in one manner rather than another’. See 
H. Butterfield, ‘The Balance of Power’, in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds), Diplomatic 
Investigations, pp. 132-148, 147. Butterfield’s definition of the balance of power can be seen in broader 
terms as a definition of order.  
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an organising concept therefore offers the possibility of theoretical coherence. 
Second, law and morality are usually considered to be things of serious importance 
for the common life in a political association.
5 In this sense my investigation 
addresses a classical theme in legal philosophy, namely, how does morality relate to 
law? Natural lawyers have insisted that the former is the foundation of the latter—a 
stance captured by the dictum ‘Unjust law is not law’ (Lex iniusta non est lex)—
whereas legal positivists have rejected this position asserting instead that morality and 
law constitute distinct domains.  
  The following pages seek to defend one specific variant of positivism, 
henceforth called ‘rule-based positivism.’
6 While the traditional version propounded 
by John Austin claims that law is a command (of a sovereign habitually obeyed)
7, the 
rule-based version associated with H. L. A. Hart, among others, postulates that ‘the 
law as it is’ presents something different from ‘the law as it ought to be’ (morality).
8 
It is important to distinguish between positivism’s two variants—one centered on 
commands and obedience and one focused on obligations and rules—because they 
produce qualitatively different understandings of international society, only the latter 
of which is able to reconcile the demands of equality and authority. To support this 
proposition, the next section begins by defining international society (or a society of 
states) as a legal association of equals.
9 This definition is consistent with traditional 
legal positivism and it poses the puzzle of international order in the following way: 
order demands a supreme decision-maker or authority but on the international scene 
each state strives to preserve its equality vis-à-vis other states or to avoid surrendering 
                                                 
5 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 84. But later on Hart qualifies 
this point, arguing that in a community morality tends to be regarded as more important than law, pp. 
172-173.  
6 My expression ‘rule-based’ positivism is similar but not identical to Terry Nardin’s ‘rule-of-law 
positivism’ as developed in his ‘Legal Positivism as a Theory of International Society’, in David R. 
Mapel and Terry Nardin (eds), International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 17-35. The terms ‘positivism’ and ‘legal positivism’ are used 
interchangeably in this paper. Sometimes it is argued that legal positivism implies ‘objectivity’ 
characteristic of logical positivism associated with Rudolf Carnap, Viktor Kraft, or Karl Popper (The 
Vienna Circle), and that therefore legal and logical positivism are related doctrines. But Hart denies the 
cogency of this relationship. See H. L. A. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’, in 
Ronald M. Dworkin (ed.), The Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 17-37, 
p. 18, n. 1. 
7 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined And the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954 [1832]). For Austin’s claim that ‘each and every law is a 
command’ see p. 13 and for the argument that sovereign is a superior habitually obeyed, p. 194. 
8 Hart, The Concept of Law; Nardin, ‘Legal Positivism as a Theory of International Society’; Michael 
Oakeshott, ‘The Rule of Law’, in Michael Oakeshott, On History and Other Essays (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 1999), pp. 129-178.  
9 Order need not be equated to law (or even to rules).  For an alternative articulation of international 
society based on rules but not on legal rules see Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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its individual decision-making power. Does international society exemplify this 
tension? It appears to be so. But rule-based legal positivism provides a different 
answer by redefining international society as a system of legal rules rather than as 
aggregate of agents. Such redefinition would imply that international authority is not a 
person or an agent (who commands habitual obedience). To spell out what precisely 
the notion of such international authority involves, one must determine where 
authority resides, not who holds it. And since an investigation of authority is peculiar 
to political theory, this essay can be seen as an attempt to identify the locus  of 
authority on the map of international political theory.  
 
 
International order: authority vs. equality? 
 
The opposition between authority and equality is a graver issue for international than 
for domestic order, where authority is taken to trump equality. As Thomas Hobbes 
writes, the social contract, by establishing the state as an authoritative system of law, 
subordinates a group of previously independent individuals to the will of a common 
sovereign.
10 There is no equality between ruler(s) and ruled since the former alone 
can amend or repeal the existing laws. Although a party to the social contract upon its 
institution—in the ‘original position’—the sovereign remains outside the contract, 
after it is instituted (The rulers are exempt from the law they create). Domestically, 
citizens are willing to obtain order at the expense of equality. But states—and this 
marks a key difference between the state and the citizen—are reluctant to sacrifice 
equality to purchase order. This is why order is a problem for interstate relations in 
the first place.
11  
It is instructive to consider the two canonical approaches—associated with 
Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes—of establishing order among states. Both Grotius 
and Hobbes equate law to order. But while Hobbes postulates that law can be found 
solely inside the state, Grotius holds that law exists between states.
12 For Hobbes, law 
is a property of the state—the state is a legal order—whereas the international realm is 
                                                 
10 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981 [1651]), chs. 13, 
14, 20, 21.  
11 Nicholas J. Rengger, International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order: Beyond 
International Relations Theory (New York and London: Routledge, 2000). 
12 Relevant here are the first two volumes of the translation of Hugo Grotius’s The Law of War and 
Peace. 
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disorder and lawlessness.
13 This however does not mean that a concept of 
international order cannot be derived from Hobbes’s theory. It can, leading to an 
extrapolation of the Hobbesian domestic model into a world state. The important 
consideration is that for Hobbes law always resides in a state—either an individual 
state (original Hobbes’s model) or a world state (the extrapolated model). Yet, the 
classic worry is that a state which encompasses the entire political space of the globe 
would be tyrannical. The wish to defend the individual state’s independence against 
encroachment by such a hypothetical universal empire has led political thinkers to 
suggest that equality should have priority over authority, as a guiding principle of 
interstate relations. This is the well-known argument supporting the balance of 
power.
14  
Curiously, the principles of equality and authority clash even when one adopts 
the Grotian frame of reference. Grotius postulates the existence of an international 
society—a compact of legal equals. But precisely because his frame of reference is 
juridical, the concept of equality conflicts with the concept of authority. The difficulty 
is obvious: if states are taken to be legally equal, they cannot at the same time be 
subordinated to a legal superior. This is the paradox underpinning both Grotius’s and 
Hobbes’s position.  Authority and equality appear to be mutually opposed ideas for 
those who reject the possibility of international order adopting the original Hobbesian 
stance, but also for those who endorse this possibility following Grotius. To untangle 






                                                 
13 Hobbes is traditionally seen as a proponent of a physicalist theory of society and state. But Michael 
Oakeshott reads him in a legalist fashion, and I adopt Oakeshott’s reading here. Michael Oakeshott, 
Hobbes on Civil Association (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975).  
14 Canonical expositions of the classical balance of power doctrine include Friedrich von Gentz, 
Fragments on the Balance of Power in Europe [Fragmente aus der neuesten Geschichte des politischen 
Gleichgewichts in Europa] (London, 1806) and A. H. L. Heeren, A Manual of the History of the 
Political System of Europe and Its Colonies From Its Formation at the Close of the Fifteenth Century 
to Its Reestablishment upon the Fall of Napoleon [Handbuch der Geschichte des europäischen 
Staatensystems und seiner Colonien von seiner Bildung seit der Entdeckung beider Indien bis zu seiner 
Wiederherstellung nach dem Fall des Französischen Kaiserthrons], 5th edn, 2 vols (Oxford: Talboys, 
1834). For a contemporary assessment, see Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1955). 
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Authority as sovereignty: Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes 
 
In political theory, authority is conventionally linked to sovereignty. The following 
section aims to show that this link has significant implications for international 
political theory. Jean Bodin articulated the idea of sovereignty in the sixteenth 
century, although it can be traced back to thirteenth-century debates over the scope of 
princely power.
15 Hitherto, medieval legal discourse had centered on the notion of an 
immutable, universal order of things—‘natural law’ (ius naturale)—of which princes 
were passive interpreters. But Bodin upset the predominant mode of thinking by 
portraying them as active law-makers. He defined sovereignty as legislative 
prerogative—that is, as supreme power to create law as opposed to capacity to merely 
interpret the already available legal arrangements.
16 But Bodin’s radicalism should 
not be overstated since he accepted the then-conventional argument that each prince is 
subject to natural law.
17  
  Further, for Bodin sovereignty is perpetual, absolute, and indivisible.
18 It is 
‘indivisible’ in the sense that it comprises a single type of power—in this case, 
embodied in the legislative office. It is ‘perpetual’ because it extends over the entire 
life of the ruler who holds it,
19 and it is ‘absolute’ since it is the highest power in a 
political association which implies an unconditional license.
20 The people can 
institute such power—that is, an absolute mandate to do things in a realm—by giving 
up their rights to the rulers via transfer which is unconditional and complete. This 
procedure presupposes the notion of a right. If the people have no rights, they will 
simply have nothing to give away to the sovereign. As Richard Tuck observes, ‘…to 
have any kind of right [is] to be a dominus—to have sovereignty over that bit of one’s 
world…’.
21 The idea of sovereignty is connected to the idea of rights—both invoke an 
independent agent who can own, and therefore claim, things. Both place the agent or 
                                                 
15 See Brian Tierney, ‘“The Prince is not Bound by the Laws”. Accursius and the Origins of the 
Modern State’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 5, no. 4 (1963), pp. 378-400; Kenneth 
Pennington,  The Prince and the Law, 1200-1600: Sovereignty and Rights in the Western Legal 
Tradition (Berkley: University of California Press, 1993). 
16 Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from the Six Books of the Commonwealth, ed. and tr. 
Julian H. Franklin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), ch. 10. 
17 Bodin, On Sovereignty, pp. 31, 39. 
18 Bodin, On Sovereignty, p. 1; ch. 9. 
19 Bodin, On Sovereignty, p. 6. 
20 Bodin, On Sovereignty, pp. 7-8.  
21 Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979), p. 28. Dominium for Tuck stands for ‘ownership’. But this essay attempts to 
show that it is more coherent to link the idea of sovereignty to dominium understood as a ‘realm’ and 
specifically as ‘legal realm’.  
  6ConWEB No 1/2007   Silviya Lechner 
the individual in the centre of political discourse. Hobbes and John Locke, writing in 
the later contractarian tradition, explicitly adopt the vocabulary of rights to theorise 
sovereignty, thereby also embracing the paradigm of individualism.
22
Two aspects of Bodin’s argument have relevance for international relations. 
First, by emphasising the legislative prerogative of princes, Bodin associates 
sovereignty with the state—for him sovereignty stands for ‘state sovereignty’. This is 
an important clarification because sovereignty can be interpreted more broadly, to 
mean autonomy of choice, discretion, or agency. In this latter meaning, it can 
characterise entities other than states.
23 Secondly, Bodin’s definition of sovereignty 
demarcates a border between the international and the domestic. Recall that inside the 
state, rulers possess an ultimate law-making power (over positive or instituted laws) 
but outside it, they can only interpret natural law (perennial law residing in God, 
Nature or Reason). For Bodin, princes, and therefore states, coexist in a domain 
regulated by natural law.  
Bodin’s idea that princes are bound by the law of nature, Hobbes transforms 
into a doctrine of the state of nature. Ius naturale (Bodin) or, alternatively, the state of 
nature (Hobbes) is the condition of international coexistence among princes. But 
while Bodin seems to think that a shared law of nature will curb rulers’ ambitions and 
mitigate international conflict, Hobbes claims the reverse. For Hobbes, the state of 
nature is a state of war. Interestingly, despite the difference in starting premises, 
Hobbes reaches the same conclusion as Bodin—the sovereignty of the individual state 
translates into legal independence between states.
24 If the state commands supreme 
power, as Bodin maintains, the relations between states must be predicated on the 
premise of nominal equality. Otherwise, one ruler would have to be treated as unequal 
or subordinate to another, but this entails a contradiction since by definition each 
prince is supreme in its realm.
25 For Hobbes, it is this de jure equality between states 
which renders war an ever present possibility. In his words, ‘yet in all times, Kings 
and persons of soveraigne authority because of their independency, are in common 
                                                 
22 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980). 
23 Otto Gierke for example juxtaposes the sovereignty of the individual with the sovereignty of the 
state, when discussing late medieval political theory. See Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle 
Age (Cambridge, at the University Press, 1900), pp. 87-94. 
24 This can be inferred from Bodin’s argument that the prince is ‘bound by the contracts he has made, 
whether with his subjects or with a foreigner’, On Sovereignty, p. 35, emphasis added. 
25 The predicate ‘its’ is used to indicate that sovereignty characterises the ruler’s office, not the ruler as 
a named person.  
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continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators…which is a posture of 
war’.
26  
The upshot of Bodin’s and Hobbes’s argument is that the absolute power of 
the state internally automatically entails nominal equality between states externally. 
The ‘inside’ of the domestic constitutes the ‘outside’ of the international: one cannot 
theorise one without the other.
27 Sovereignty, despite that it characterises the state, is 
a concept which becomes intelligible on the border between the domestic and the 
international.
28  
It follows that the expression ‘to be sovereign’, used when talking about states, 
has a dual connotation—within the discourse of domestic politics it means ‘to be 
supreme in one’s own realm’, and within that of international politics it means ‘to be 
nominally equal or independent from other agents (states)’. But none of these 
definitions is fit to sustain a theory of international order. For what each definition 
includes is the idea of international equality but the idea of international authority—
or precisely what a theory of international order demands—is absent. To articulate the 
missing international authority element Bodin’s and Hobbes’s notion of sovereignty 
has to reconstructed, so that it accounts for two distinctions: (a) between authority and 




A decisionist theory of sovereignty: Carl Schmitt  
 
It is helpful to investigate a theory of politics which conflates these distinctions—
authority-power, and sovereignty-sovereign—as exemplified by Carl Schmitt’s 
writings. Schmitt won much popularity with his dictum that ‘[s]overeign is he who 
decides on the exception.’
29 This was the opening line of his 1922 Political Theology 
where he expounded a view of sovereign power based on an exaggerated, almost 
totalitarian, interpretation of Hobbes. In a later book, The Political, Schmitt argued 
that the state is the only agent commanding such an ultimate power, thereby linking 
                                                 
26 Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 187-8; spelling in the original, emphasis added. 
27 R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993). 
28 Robert Jackson, ‘Martin Wight and the Good Life’, Millennium, vol. 19, no. 2 (1990), pp. 261-272, 
p. 261.  
29 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, tr. Georg Swab 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005 [1922]), p. 5.  
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sovereignty to the state.
30 Schmitt’s reputation as a legal writer was tarnished because 
of his involvement with the Third Reich. Ironically, his Hobbesian argument in 
Political Theology can be read as having anti-totalitarian implications for 
strengthening the Weimer constitution against extremist parties such as Hitler’s 
National Socialist German Workers’ Party.  
  Characteristically, Schmitt defines sovereignty as power to decide. His 
statement that ‘the sovereign decides on the exception’ merits special attention. It 
contains two propositions: one stipulating an act of deciding; and one asserting the 
presence of a person who has prerogative to decide. Nothing however sets limits on 
decision-making—the sovereign alone is the source of exception. Here Schmitt 
engages the conventional reading of Hobbes, where the rulers are outside the law—
they institute law but are not themselves bound by it. The conclusion Schmitt reaches 
is that sovereignty resides in a decision, and that the legal order is product of the 
sovereign’s command.
 31  
In all likelihood Schmitt was influenced by Hobbes’s claim that law is 
command. Indeed, Hobbes holds that ‘a law is the command of him, or them that have 
the sovereign power, given to those that be his or their subjects, declaring publicly 
and plainly what every of them may do, and what they must forbear to do’.
32 But this 
is hardly a decisive textual evidence to support the view that Hobbes is a consistent 
proponent of a command theory of law. (Actually, Bodin is relatively more prone to 
describing law as command.
33) The troubling pronouncement which links law to 
command is made by Hobbes in A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student
34, 
whereas  The Leviathan is structured around the argument that the sovereign acts 
because, ultimately, it is authorised by the body politic and not because of its 
unlimited power of discretion.
 Hobbes thus writes: ‘For it has been already shewn that 
nothing the sovereign representative can doe to a Subject, on what pretence soever, 
can properly be called injustice, or injury; because every subject is author of every act 
                                                 
30 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of The Political, tr. Georg Swab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996 [1932]).  
31 Carl Schmitt later elaborates this view in his The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: 
Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol, tr. George Swab and Erna Hilfstein (London: Greenwood 
Press, 1996 [1938]).  
32 Thomas Hobbes, A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England 
(1681) The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury: Now First Collected and Edited by Sir 
William Molesworth, 6 vols, vol. VI (London: Bohn, 1839-45), p. 26, emphasis added. 
33 Bodin, On Sovereignty, pp. 11, 51. 
34 See note 31 above.  
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the sovereign doeth’.
35 Further, ‘For he that he doth any thing by authority from 
another, doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth: But by this 
institution of a commonwealth, every particular man is author of all the soveraigne 
doth.’
36 Finally, Hobbes speaks of ‘laws, which are but rules authorised’.
37 Law, and 
sovereignty as a legislative prerogative, depends on prior authorisation rather than on 
the ruler’s command.  
Unlike Schmitt, then, Hobbes draws a distinction between power and 
authority. The distinction is twofold. First, power is ‘a can’, whereas authority is ‘an 
ought’. While authority is a capacity to do something, circumscribed by limits (social, 
moral or legal), power is a capacity to do something which admits of no limits—
agents will seek to amass more of it as long they can and provided that no competition 
presents an obstacle. Second, authority implies authorisation, and this effectively 
means, transfer of rights. It is not accidental that Hobbes terms the social contract—
the cradle of sovereignty—‘the mutual transferring of right.’
38 Rights stand for 
claims, and to hold a right means that another agent has a corresponding obligation to 
acknowledge it.
  But power is not a relationship between right-holders. It is what 
Hobbes calls ‘liberty’: discretion, a capacity to decide anyway one sees fit. Despite 
appearances, a right and liberty are notions which have little in common.
39 The idea 
of rights presupposes a relationship between agents (that is, between more than one 
agent), and specifically, a relationship in terms of obligation. Conversely, the idea of 
liberty does not suggest such a relationship—it pertains to an atomistic individual 
outside society. It is evident that any social order, be it domestic or international, 
needs to move beyond an atomistic discourse of liberties and into a genuinely social 
discourse of rights and obligations.  
Since Schmitt treats sovereignty as liberty—as a capacity to decide—he ends 
up conflating sovereignty (the principle) with the sovereign (the holder of this 
principle).  Instead of asking ‘What is sovereignty?’, Schmitt asks ‘Who is the 
sovereign?’ But authority understood in this way—as a single author with supreme 
                                                 
35 Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 264-5. 
36 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 232. 
37 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 388. 
38 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 192. 
39 Hobbes expresses this in the following manner: ‘A right is liberty, namely that liberty which the civil 
law leaves us, but civil law is an obligation; and takes from us the liberty which the law of nature gave 
us. Nature gave a right to every man to secure him selfe by his own strength and to invade a suspected 
neighbour, by way of prevention; but the civil law takes away that liberty, in all cases, where the 
protection of the law may be safely stayd for. Insomuch as lex and jus are as different as obligation and 
liberty,’ Leviathan, pp. 334-5.    
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discretion—cannot be applied internationally. Given the premise of a multitude of 
independent agents (states), an all-powerful leviathan cannot dominate the 
international realm. Domestic authority may technically be equated to a common 
sovereign ruler but international authority cannot—this violates the assumption of 
international plurality. This however does not mean that some final, authoritative 
source operating in the international sphere cannot be identified. It only means that 
such a source cannot be a person (or a body of people): the only option left is that it 
must be a principle.  
 
 
Sovereignty and the right to life: Giorgio Agamben   
 
Aside from considerations of international relations, there is another reason as to why 
sovereignty as a principle should not be confused with the supreme discretion of a 
ruler. Let us consider Schmitt’s argument once again. Schmitt claims that liberalism 
invests in the value of deliberation but when an imminent threat, war, is impending, 
there is no time for deliberating (or parliamentary procedures)—someone must 
decide. This someone is the ruler(s) who mobilises the citizens to defend the country 
against an enemy for ‘to the enemy concept’, he goes on to remark, ‘belongs the ever 
present possibility of combat’.
40 ‘The political’ is an act of deciding as to who the 
enemy or friend of the nation is:  
 
The political is the most extreme and intense antagonism, and every concrete 
antagonism becomes that much more political the closer it approaches the most 
extreme point, that of the friend-enemy grouping. In its entirety the state as an 
organized political entity decides for itself the friend-enemy distinction.
41  
 
But war, for Schmitt, is not an abstract theoretical threat—it is an existential threat;
42 
it involves the ‘possibility of real killing,’ and compromises the life of the community 
directly and immediately.
43 The state therefore must possess absolute power to decide 
in situations of immanent danger.
44 This justifies the state—or the sovereign—in 
                                                 
40 Schmitt, The Political, p. 32. 
41 Schmitt, The Political, pp. 29-30. 
42 Schmitt, The Political, pp. 28, 33, 72-73.  
43 Schmitt, The Political, p. 49. 
44 Schmitt, The Political, pp. 20, 39, 43. 
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laying claim on the lives of its soldiers and citizens, who are called upon to die in its 
name.  
Sovereignty, then, is about the right to life and death in a polity.
45 This is why 
the sovereign not merely decides but decides ‘on the exception’—that is, settles the 
matter as to whether someone else will live or die. And this is why it is dangerous to 
treat this power as a mere decision left in the hands of rulers unchecked by common 
rules (constitutional limitations as in the rule-of-law tradition).  
It is instructive to contrast Hobbes’s and Schmitt’s position over the right of 
life and death. Hobbes postulates a natural  right to life: the state is instituted to 
protect this right and all civil rights can be seen as derivative from it.
46 This natural 
right is unalienable—the individual cannot transfer it to the state.
47 The sovereign can 
sentence a subject to death for crimes but such a ruling concerns the person as a 
citizen, not as a natural (living) being. Citizens are obligated to keep the law but they 
are not obligated to die; hence they can resist the sovereign and try to escape the 
sentence. In Hobbes own words, ‘For by allowing him [the sovereign] to kill me, I am 
not bound to kill my selfe when he commands me’.
48  Here lies, I think, the 
fundamental difference between Hobbes and Schmitt.
 Schmitt views the imperative to 
defend one’s country as a higher morality which suspends all other moral codes—
including the individual’s right to life.
49 This transforms the state into a political 
sphere where human existence is no longer sufficiently valued. For Schmitt, the 
citizens have an obligation to die for the state. But for Hobbes, citizens have an 
obligation to live, and the state is solely an instrument for completing this task. 
The ‘state of exception’—by reference to which Schmitt justifies sovereign 
power  and its ultimate right to death—is what thinkers since antiquity have called 
expediency. Expedient is a situation where criteria are unavailable to guide action but 
choice cannot be avoided—the agent must act. And while the idiom of expediency or 
necessity can hardly be eliminated from politics, it cannot ground a theory of political 
order. This is so because under the weight of the expedient or the necessary all moral 
and legal discourse breaks down. As the ancient Romans warn us, ‘necessity has no 
law’ (necessitas legem non habet). To render expediency the master-concept of the 
                                                 
45 Bodin, On Sovereignty, p. 56; Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), ch. 4. 
46 A similar argument is advanced by H. L. A. Hart, ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’, Philosophical 
Review, vol. 64, no. 2 (1955), pp. 175-91. 
47 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 268.  
48 Leviathan, p. 269 
49 Schmitt, The Political, pp. 47, 71. 
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political order is to claim that when arranging our political life we need not bother 
with questions of morality and law. 
But Giorgio Agamben has argued that Schmitt’s notion of the sovereign 
exception does not deny the legal order. It only suspends it.
 50 (Schmitt’s approach in 
other words does not amount to a necessitas legem non habet clause.
51) The ‘state of 
exception’, in Agamben’s reading of Schmitt, designates the boundary of the legal 
order.
52 It is ‘the definition of the very space in which the juridico-political order can 
have validity’.
53 And it is ‘the threshold where fact and law seem to become 
undecidable’,
54 since the sovereign must decide (this decision is a matter of fact) on 
the question of who counts as a citizen or insider to the legal system and who does not 
(this question is a matter of law).  
For Agamben, the boundary of the legal order is revealed in the distinction 
between outlaws and criminals.
55 Although criminals are liable to punishment, they 
are still admitted to the perimeter of law and enjoy legal rights (right to trial, for 
example). But the Taliban detainees currently held at Guantánamo by the George W. 
Bush administration or Jews during the Third Reich have no such rights.
56  Each of 
them exemplifies what Agamben calls homo sacer—an outlaw.
 Killing homo sacer 
entails no legal sanction since law is blind to the existence of outlaws (they are 
literally ‘out’ of ‘the law’).
  57 A person of this sort occupies an in-between position 
between a living being and a political being (citizen). Homo sacer has no political life 
or bios, and as a result of this, also no bare life or zoē. Agamben concludes, ‘The 
fundamental categorical pair of Western politics is not that of [Schmittian] 
friend/enemy, but that of bare life/political existence, zoē/bios, inclusion/exclusion.’
58 
Declaring an exception to the law—that is, stripping people of citizenship, or 
excluding them from the realm of law so that atrocities committed against them, such 
as deportation to camps, do not call for justification—is an act of moral significance.  
Because of its relationship to the right to life and death, the sovereign decision is 
never just a technical act of deciding.  
                                                 
50 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, tr. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 
p. 33; Agamben, Homo Sacer, pp. 17-18. 
51 Agamben, State of Exception, pp. 1, 24.  
52 Agamben, State of Exception, pp. 4, 23. 
53 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 19. 
54 Agamben, State of Exception, p. 29.  
55 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 20. 
56 Agamben, State of Exception, pp. 3-4. 
57 Agamben, Homo Sacer, ch. 3. 
58 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 8. 
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Agamben’s concern is that the state of exception, with its moral enormity, 
threatens to turn into a norm of modern political life. And it can be added, 
‘international political life.’ Indeed, homo sacer is often constructed as a threat by 
reference to the international. This throws light on Hobbes’s argument that a 
commonwealth is designed for the sake of protecting the citizenry from an external 
attack—that is, not from other violent factions inside the state, but from other states.
59 
And for Schmitt the political is a condition of confronting a public enemy—an enemy 
of the nation—not a foe or ‘a private adversary whom one hates’.
60 The model of 
political conflict for Schmitt and for Hobbes is one community pitted against another, 
not one individual fighting another. What this suggests is that the idea of sovereign 
power cannot expulse moral judgment and that such judgment cannot be restricted to 
the area of domestic politics —it extends to that of international politics.  
 
 
Authority and the limits on sovereign power  
 
Whether the sovereign is inside the law or outside it, Agamben reminds us, is not an 
analytical question. It is a moral question—it concerns the moral limits of 
sovereignty. And as elucidated before, the idea of limits transforms power into 
authority. Instead of sovereign power, moral discourse demands a consideration of 
sovereign authority.  
But thinkers like Schmitt tend to reduce sovereignty to power, and moreover 
to personified power. The rationale is that because sovereignty is something absolute, 
it must be indivisible, and, when this view is pushed to the extreme, that such 
indivisibility resides in the body of a named ruler (or rulers).
61 But sovereignty need 
not be indivisible. For Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for example, it is shared between the 
government and the people. As Rousseau points out: ‘The sovereign, having no other 
force than the legislative power, acts only by means of the laws, and the laws being 
nothing but authentic acts of the general will, the sovereign can act only when the 
people is assembled’.
62 And in contemporary theories of federalism, sovereignty can 
be split between various branches of government (and the people). The idea is not that 
                                                 
59 Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 232-233.  
60 Schmitt, The Political, p. 28, emphasis added. 
61 Throughout The Political, Schmitt refers to the sovereign as ‘he’.  
62 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Writings, ed. and tr. Victor Gourevitch 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 110, emphasis added. 
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one branch is subordinate to another but that each embodies one aspect of 
sovereignty—say, legislative sovereignty as opposed to executive sovereignty.
 Yet for 
such divisibility to be conceivable, sovereignty has to be defined as a principle—that 
is, as authority—rather than as the decision-making power of a ruler (rulers).  
  Further, those who view sovereignty as indivisible tend to portray it as 
unlimited. But as John Salmond noted, the argument that sovereignty is indivisible—
the fact, that there is one generic type of supreme authority rather than different 
species of it—should not be confused with the argument that sovereignty 
acknowledges no limitations.
63 Even for writers like Bodin who assert its 
indivisibility, sovereignty is constrained by the precepts of natural law,
64 as well as by 
certain ‘constitutional’ provisions (for example, the sovereign cannot levy taxes 
without the citizens’ explicit consent).
65 And notably, for Hobbes, sovereign authority 
cannot exist before  law is instituted.
66  Hobbes’s position is not explicitly 
constitutionalist but it can be interpreted along these lines. It implies that the 
sovereign changes laws not by virtue of some ultimate discretion but within the 
framework of the law, that is, in accordance with a constitution.  
Is it possible to have an international constitution that governs state relations? 
This is the central question a theory of international order has to address (given the 
assumption of statehood). And if international authority is not an all-powerful actor—
a universal empire—but a principle, where does this principle reside? What is the 







                                                 
63 John Salmond, Jurisprudence, 8th edn, ed. C. A. W. Manning (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1930 
[1902]), pp. 524-531, 531.  
64 Bodin, On Sovereignty, pp. 8, 13. 
65 Bodin, On Sovereignty, pp. 21, 40.  
66 Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 14. 
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International authority and international equality  
 
Obligations, rules, and human agents 
 
In articulating the idea of an international constitution that governs state relations, 
rule-based positivism explores two interrelated concepts—rules and obligations. The 
following pages will first consider how this approach theorises rules and obligations 
as they characterise a domestic political association (of human beings), and will then 
examine them in the context of an international political association such as the 
society of states.  
In Simmons’ apt phrase, an obligation is a ‘requirement’. ‘Obligations,’ he 
remarks, ‘are limitations on our freedom, impositions on our will, which must be 
discharged regardless of inclinations.’
67 Like any other prescription, an obligation 
supposes that certain conduct is due (that is why obligations are often equated to 
duties 
68); that is, the obligee must perform the action specified in the obligation. ‘The 
fact that obligations are requirements,’ Simmons continues, ‘accounts for the intimate 
tie between the concept of obligation …and the notions of force and coercion which 
we associate with it. For to be “required” to act seems always to involve, at the very 
least, a serious pressure to perform.’
69 When obligations are not discharged, the 
injured party has a legitimate reason to seek redress, coercively if it comes to this.   
  As Hart argues in a well-known passage, in society there will always be those 
who fulfill their obligations because of a fear of sanctions (the exponents of what Hart 
termed the ‘external point of view’) and those who honor their obligations because 
this is the right thing to do (those who have adopted ‘the internal point of view’).
70 
Clearly, this latter notion of obligation is moral—for it specifies what ought to be 
done. Were society a club of angels or altruistic beings, it could perhaps sustain itself 
as a web of obligations. Unfortunately however, there is a great temptation among 
most people to refuse to discharge their obligations while benefiting from other agents 
                                                 
67 A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1979), p. 7. 
68 Hart distinguishes duties from obligations in ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’. He argues the 
following: that duties (general moral obligations) are owed by all persons to all others while obligations 
have a more specific character; that unlike duties, obligations require an actual act or performance; that 
obligations give rise to correlative rights; and that the character of obligation is determined by virtue of 
its being a relationship between persons, not by virtue of the act it pertains to (p. 179, n. 7); Simmons  
invokes Hart’s criteria in Moral Principles and Political Obligations, p. 14-15, n. 12. 
69 Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, p. 7. 
70 Hart, The Concept of Law, pp. 86-88 and ch. 6.  
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who dutifully do so.
71 One way to understand the relationship between law and 
morality, according to the sort of positivism Hart recommends, is to think of law as a 
coercive institution designed to enforce (moral) obligations.  
  Yet, it would be wrong from a Hartian perspective to claim that coercion gives 
force to obligations. The possibility that obligations can be coercively enforced does 
not create obligations; it only increases their efficacy.
72 For an obligation must be in 
existence before it can be enforced. This has led many to accord to international law 
the standing of law proper even though it lacks centralised coercive organs, and even 
though it is weak compared to the centralised coercive system of municipal law. But if 
obligation is not the product of coercion, what generates it? The answer for legal 
obligation is usually: fact. Legal obligation exists because it forms part of the legal 
system under which a given agent (the same one who has to discharge this legal 
obligation) lives. Moral  obligations however are invariably product of choice.
73 
Agents undertake obligations or commitments voluntarily or via self-binding. Moral 
obligations are traceable to acts of will which have the form of I-statements. This 
provoked J. L. Austin to comment: ‘Similarly, an anxious parent when his child has 
been asked to do something may say ‘He promises, do not you Willy? But little Willy 
must still himself say ‘I promise’ if he is really to have promised.’
74
For this reason, it would be inappropriate to assert that all obligations are at 
bottom moral.  As A. Simmons argues, different obligations have different ground.
75 
There are not only legal and moral obligations (like those just mentioned in the 
paragraph above) but also other forms of obligations; for example, the obligation a 
professor has to mark student papers.
76 ‘Ground’ is a felicitous expression not to be 
confused with ‘reasons’. Even careful students of Hart, like Joseph Raz, succumb to 
the problematic notion of reasons (although Hart who used the term repeatedly should 
                                                 
71 Hart, The Concept of Law, p. 191. 
72 Hart, The Concept of Law, pp. 100-101. 
73 An alternative reading, prioritising duties over special obligations, would dispute my interpretation 
here since, in contrast to special moral obligations like promises which are self-imposed, duties are 
held to be ‘in the nature of things’. For a recent illuminating discussion of how nature (and specifically 
the natural reasonableness of human beings as captured by the tradition of natural law) as opposed to 
choice is foundational for morality see John Finnis, ‘Natural Law: The Classical Tradition’, in Jules 
Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 1-60. 
74 Austin’s point is that promises, as a special sort of obligations and commitments, can only be 
undertaken in the first person singular. We cannot commit somebody else through an act of our own. 
See L. J. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2nd edn, ed. J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962 [1955]), Lecture V, p. 63.  
75 Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, pp. 20, 23. 
76 Simmons calls this class of obligations ‘positional’ to distinguish them from ‘moral duties’. Moral 
Principles and Political Obligations, pp. 16-22. 
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be blamed). Raz claims that obligations grant us ‘reasons for action’, and that 
authority should be understood as ‘normative power’ which specifies ‘excusive 
reasons for action’ (or overrides other exclusive reasons).
77  But the trouble with this 
line of reasoning is that no obligation by itself (leaving aside for a moment the thorny 
issue of what kind of obligation that is) suffices to provide action with closure. That 
is, we do not act towards our fellows because of considerations expressed in the form 
of obligation alone. To expect that the idea of obligation can capture all the modalities 
of social action is to burden it in a way no concept can endure. But even if we restrict 
the realm at issue to that of moral conduct—moral obligation cannot be the only 
consideration as to how we act towards other agents (since besides duty, motives and 
emotions can be such moral considerations). As Hart exclaims: ‘Moral obligation and 
duty are the bedrock of social morality but they are not the whole.’
78
  The distinction between ground and reasons matters because it elucidates the 
connection between rules and obligations. Rules impose obligations.
79 While 
obligations consist in prescriptions—setting obligatory limitations on conduct—rules 
are propositions which spell out or generalise these limits (‘No dogs on the elevator!’ 
for example is a rule).
80 But rules provide us with ground, not with a reason to act. 
They tell us how to do something (behave morally or sing beautifully) not what to do 
(‘Be nice to Jack!’ or ‘Sing a song now!’). A ground is a standard of conduct which 
governs action without thereby guiding it: agents are always free to choose what to 
do. Expressed differently, rules constrain the manner of carrying out a performance, 
not the performance itself. And because rules are standards, they are: (a) general;
81 
and (b) relatively permanent.
82 Generality means that rules apply to a class of agents 
(not to Maja and Tony) but also to kinds of conduct as opposed to particular acts (to 
the signing of contracts, not to the signing of this or that contract). There would be no 
                                                 
77 Joseph Raz, Practical Reasoning and Norms (London: Hutchinson Press, 1975), pp. 29-32; Joseph 
Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), ch. 1, esp. p. 12. Raz’s position is much 
more complex and I hardly do justice to it by this observation. But my argument is confined to pointing 
out the distinction between reasons (which specify ends or reflect motives) and ground (which stands 
for a principle or something which is end- or motive-independent).  
78 Hart, The Concept of Law, p. 179; Simmons, Moral Principles and Legal Obligations, p. 25.  
79 Oakeshott ‘The Rule of Law’, p. 141; Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 121; See also note 38 above on Hobbes linking law to 
obligation.  
80 As Hart argues, obligation and rule are related but not fully coterminous ideas. Whether certain rules 
are viewed as giving rise to obligations depends on ‘the insistence on importance or seriousness of 
social pressure behind the rules’, The Concept of Law, p. 84, emphasis in the original.  
81 Hart, The Concept of Law, p. 21.   
82 Hart, The Concept of Law, p. 23.  
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point of having a standard, say a meter, if this measurement unit constantly changed 
(in length) or if it were meant to serve Maja and Tony but nobody else.  
What is more, generality and permanence are qualities differentiating a rule 
from a command. Commands are temporary orders which expire on the spot, but rules 
are ‘standing orders’.
83 And while it is possible to identify a command solely by 
reference to its issuer (who surely remains exempt from this command), rules 
characterise all relevant agents taken together. The appeal of a constitutional order 
stems from the idea of rule generality or to the notion that the ‘rules apply to 
everybody.’
84 Governmental officials are obligated to act within the constitutionally 
established limits as much as everybody else.  
For Hart, a state constitution signifies the existence of rules which are legal 
rather than moral. Moral rules explicate (or condense in the form of a principle) 
obligations between autonomous agents and, in this sense, moral rules are something 
self-imposed. A moral rule cannot be imposed by force or by command, that is, by 
external agency (but a legal rule can!). The agents themselves have to choose to 
subscribe to the moral rule in question.
85 This accommodation of the idea of moral 
rules sets apart the traditional or command-based positivism of Austin from the rule-
based positivism espoused by Hart.  
Further, unlike morality, law presupposes coercion (point made above).
86 
More importantly, when different moral conventions in a polity happen to conflict 
(such as when people wonder whether upon the king’s death his son is to inherit his 
throne or not), the law reduces uncertainty by issuing pronouncements which cannot 
be overridden. In contrast to a moral system of rules, a legal system comprises 
second-order rules (Hart names these ‘rules of recognition’, ‘rules of change’ and 
‘rules of adjudication’) which authoritatively identity a disputed first order rule; that 
                                                 
83 Hart, The Concept of Law, p. 23; Oakeshott makes the same point by noting that ‘In being used, a 
rule is not used up’, On Human Conduct, p. 126. 
84 ‘Everybody’ here means ‘everybody within the relevant class’. Certain rules or laws can pertain to 
certain agents only such as public officials or soldiers. 
85 By ‘moral rule’ I mean a special moral obligation not duty. See notes 67 and 72 above.  
86 Hart argues that unlike morality which ‘punishes’ wrongs by means such as disapprobation, law is 
more stringent: it presupposes strict liability. Good motives, even when they lead to reprehensible 
effects, may and often suffice to excuse action in moral settings but rarely in legal settings. Unlike legal 
rules, moral rules are less susceptible to abrupt social change (the so-called ‘secondary rules of 
change’, which are legal rules, are meant to produce such rapid institutional change). Finally, morals 
are usually regarded as prescriptions of a relatively greater importance (when compared to law) in the 
sense that people may still obey an obsolete law but they will rarely if ever continue to reproduce an 
obsolete moral convention, The Concept of Law, pp. 169-179.  For a critique of Hart’s view that law is 
more exacting and coercive than morality see Matthew Kramer, Where Law and Morality Meet 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), ch. 8.  
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is, they determine whether this rule is ‘valid’ (whether it is part of the legal system or 
not).
87 Such pronouncements are authoritative because they settle disputes with an air 
of finality; societal members are normally obligated to accept these pronouncements 
(rather than to continue discussing them). Authority, then, is a final arbiter.  
Hart in effect claims that a system of legal rules does not stand in any 
necessary relation to morality. Law may happen to meet the requirements of morality 
but even if it does not meet them, it still, most likely, will count as law. A legal 
system merely testifies to the facticity of a way of life—of people cohabiting under 
rules. It signifies that law is accepted and practiced by a certain social group, not that 
this law is morally commendable. But Hart’s morality-law distinction does not 
indicate a refusal to engage with moral issues but a warning that a legal system can 
exists, despite that it is unjust.  To claim that law only exists if it is just, as natural 
lawyers posit, is to remain blind to the ugly reality which admits of legal systems 
which fail the test of justice (The Apartheid regime of the South African Republic). 
Rule-based legal positivism, by insisting on the separation of law from morals, is 
itself a moral position: it invites us to criticize the prevailing legal order, not to 
endorse it. 
This Hartian positivism then is concerned with morality, an attitude usually 
attributed to natural law. This is evident in Hart’s ‘minimum content of natural law’ 
thesis
88 aimed at refuting the popular positivist doctrine that law ‘may have any 
content’.
89 Every rule, and specifically a legal rule, for Hart must have a minimum 
moral content if it is to procure the utmost basic goal of societal coexistence: survival 
(given certain premises concerning human vulnerability, scarcity of recourses, and 
                                                 
87 Hart, The Concept of Law, pp. 96-107, esp. pp. 100, 105. Crucial here is Hart’s own understanding of 
positivism. The key ‘rule of recognition’ (second-order rule) in a legal system by reference to which 
the validity of other (first-order) rules is ascertained is, as Hart writes, ‘not stated but its existence is 
shown in the way in which particular [first order] rules are identified, either by courts or other officials 
or private persons and their advisers’ (p. 98, emphasis in the original). Here and in his Essays in 
Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983) Hart argues that law is not a product 
emanating from certain sources, or clearly demarcated institutions or procedures, as it is commonly 
asserted by legal positivists. Instead, law reflects the fact that social agents accept it as practice. 
Contrast Hart’s perspective with Joseph Raz’s source-based doctrine of legal positivism elaborated in 
his The Authority of Law, ch. 4 and p. 151-153. Roberto Ago, in his erudite commentary on the legal 
positivist tradition, notes that this tradition is better understood as involving the idea of law as practice 
or a social fact, rather than the idea of law as generated by sources. Roberto Ago, ‘Positive Law and 
International Law’, The American Journal of International Law, vol. 51, no. 4 (1957), pp. 691-733.   
88 Hart, The Concept of Law, pp. 189-195, esp. p. 195; Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and 
Morals’, pp. 36-37. 
89 Hart, The Concept of Law, p. 195. 
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other-regardingness).
90 This content is found in moral rules which protect persons 
(prohibit killing), property (prohibit theft), and promises (prohibit using other agents 
as means as opposed to ends in themselves). But this triad of irreducible moral 
components, in Hart’s view, characterises law, not morality.
91 Although law and 
morality rub shoulders, they continue to demarcate distinct spheres.  
 
Obligations, rules, and states 
 
Rule-based positivism offers a vocabulary to articulate a theory of international order. 
It finds expression in Hedley Bull’s account of international society as a body of rules. 
Bull’s occupation with the notion of legal rules reveals how much he was influenced 
by his teacher, Hart. It is not accidental that The Anarchical Society, Bull’s major 
work, uses as its point of departure the idea of ‘elementary goals of social life’—
moral rules forbidding killing, theft, and protecting the sanctity of promises (Pacta 
sunt servanda).
92 Bull’s elementary goals correspond to those moral rules Hart 
singled out under the rubric ‘minimum content of natural law’. And while for Bull 
such elementary goals underpin the workings of a society of human beings, it is 
plausible to see them as a moral basis of the society of states as well.  
But international society is defined as a system of legal rules. It can be said to 
exist whenever states regard such rules as authoritative or binding in their mutual 
conduct. Because of its lack of centralised coercive organs, international law cannot 
be identified as law by excusive reference to coercion. However, it can be identified 
by reference to actual social practice. That international law comprises rules then is a 
statement of social fact—it points out that in actuality state interrelations operate via 
common legal standards.  
But it is also an analytical statement because international society—conceived 
as a corpus of legal rules—is a conceptual space wherein international authority is 
located. This analytical proposition belongs to the lexicon of rule-based positivism, 
                                                 
90 Here it is helpful to contrast Hart’s with Oakeshott’s views. Oakeshott argues that certain moral rules 
are required to identify law (or the legal system). Such rules prohibit retrospective and secret laws, 
instrumental laws as well as laws which discriminate against persons or establish outlawry, ‘The Rule 
of Law’, pp. 155, 173. Philosophers like Oakeshott regard law as a mode of association premised on 
mutual respect and formal equality, not as a mode that produces these things as outcomes, much less 
mere survival. Hart’s idea that law aims to procure survival is utilitarian, and, assuming that this 
proposition is sound, it shows the limitations of rule-based positivism when it comes to exploring 
questions of morality.  
91 Hart, The Concept of Law, p. 195. 
92 Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 4, 6-7. 
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not traditional positivism. As discussed previously, rules presuppose obligations.
93 
Obligation to uphold the rules is not mere consent to the rules. Consent is a sister-idea 
of power—it refuses to acknowledge the point that action is subject to restraint. On 
this view, the state can depart from the rules whenever its interests dictate so, and this 
is what traditional positivism asserts.
94 Against this, rule-based positivism holds that 
an obligation renders certain ways of acting unacceptable and that these must be 
forborne, even when doing so prejudices the agent’s interest.   
This argument helps us to further clarify the definition of international society. 
As Nardin writes, ‘“Statehood” is a role defined by the rules that constitute 
international society’.
95 That is, no intrinsic or essential properties of statehood exist 
outside those rules. If a state claims to be a member of international society, it has to 
pledge commitment to its rules— its diplomatic conventions, its rules regulating the 
use of force, its legal principles—and act in accordance with those (most of the time). 
In a similar fashion, Immanuel Kant, and more recently John Rawls have maintained 
that a law-abiding state or ‘republic’ should abstain from violence on the international 
scene.
96 This is a logical point. It would be contradictory for a state to identify itself 
with respect for the law (as democracies or ‘republics’ in Kantian terms purport to do) 
but then go on to violate legal rules. Proclaimed standards of international conduct 
can be transgressed, but when this happens, such illegitimate actions can be judged, 
and exposed for what they are. This is why any discussion of authority and order is, at 
the end of the day, a moral deliberation.  
On the premises of rule-based positivism, the society of states is a system of 
legal rules. The international legal order is taken to parallel the domestic legal order. 
Like the equation between order and law, this parallelism is an assumption—it is not a 
foundational truth. But it is a potent assumption nonetheless because the concept of 
                                                 
93 This idea, as applied to state relations, is articulated powerfully in J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: 
An Introduction to the International Law of Peace, 6th edn, rev. C. H. M. Waldock (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1963).   
94 A critic may argue that conduct or rules promoted by international organisations like the UN 
eventually depend on the consent of individual states. States in short will tend to abide by the rules 
when this corresponds to their interest but will digress from these when such correspondence is lacking. 
That international law is weak law when compared to municipal law is hard to dispute. Yet, 
international law does impose obligations, as evident from the wide-spread practice where states (or 
rather state officials) excuse or justify their actions by reference to the rules of international legality. 
Public justification of this sort, addressed to other states (officials), indicates that these rules are 
recognised as valid. 
95 Nardin, ‘Legal Positivism as a Theory of International Society’, p. 21.  
96 Immanuel Kant, ‘Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch’, in Kant's Political Writings, ed. 
Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1795] 1991), pp. 93-130; John Rawls, The Law 
of Peoples (Harvard University Press, 1999). 
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authority accompanies law. Authority, like law, presupposes hierarchy; it also 
presupposes conduct bound by limits or duty (obligation). This marks an important 
distinction between authority and power—power is not constrained by duty. There is 
an additional difference. As the section on Schmitt illustrated, power implies that one 
agent (the sovereign) decides for another (the subject). But moral or legitimate 
authority is self-imposed: agents decide for themselves. The subject chooses to respect 
the sovereign, and the individual state chooses to treat the rules of international 
legality as obligatory. Care should be taken not to confuse the legitimacy of authority 
(which is a question about the moral quality of authority) with the facticity of 
authority (the existence of authority regardless of its legitimacy).  
It follows that international order exhibits two fundamental modalities.  The 
first materialises when a body (or an agent) commands, directs, and dominates its 
fellows through sheer power. While such a body may call itself authority, its rulings 
exemplify pure decisionism. In the realm of domestic politics, this yields the picture 
of a Schmittian all-powerful sovereign, whereas in the realm of international politics it 
is tantamount to an interventionist empire (following the precepts of realpolitik).  
The second modality is an international society. It springs into being whenever 
a group of states consider a stock of international legal procedures as authoritative and 
binding among themselves. But since within such a common framework of rules 
states enjoy equality—and here the classical constitutionalist thesis of citizen equality 
before the law is extended to states
97—this modality of international order meets both 
the demands of equality and authority. It appears that the puzzle of international order 
which has been driving the present inquiry is resolved.   
But this would be an illusion because two major difficulties remain. One is 
that we never simply wish to establish the fact of order; we wish to establish its 
justice. We want to know whether the prevailing order—be it among human beings or 
among states—is just or not. It is not the case, as Bull seems to have thought, that the 
two issues can be treated in isolation.
98 True, from an analytical point of view (of 
rule-based positivism) these issues are separate but from a moral point of view (to 
which a rule-based positivism is not at all inimical) they are not. Unless the legal 
                                                 
97 States however are not equal in rights, since unlike law which implies general obligation between an 
agent and all other agents in society, a right refers to particular obligations. An obligation of the latter 
sort is held against a particular agent or in relation to a particular good. 
98 Hedley Bull, ‘Justice in International Relations: The 1983-84 Hagey Lectures’, in Kai Alderson and 
Andrew Hurrell (eds), Hedley Bull on International Society (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999 
[1984]). Despite common perception, in this work Bull does not substantively modify his earlier view 
of order as separate from justice.  
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principles of international society embody self-imposed rules, that is, moral rules, this 
society can claim authority (final, obligation imposing rules) but not legitimate 
(morally textured) authority.  
This entails a second difficulty, as Hart was all too well aware.  It is always 
possible for a powerful majority to institute (through coercion) a system of legally 
binding rules which discriminate against minorities.
99 The great powers or a single 
superpower for example can establish an “international society”, or a set of legal 
arrangements, which are morally unfair towards its weaker members. In such a 
situation the reference to rules and obligations will be just empty talk, since the case 
will resemble empire (the first modality) rather than a genuine international society 
(the second modality).
100 The notion of ‘rules’ and ‘obligations’ in other words is too 
crude. It does not tell us whether a particular order is just or not. Justice can be 
secured if the legal rules of the order in question, at the same time, have a character of 
moral rules or self-imposed rules. This demands that agents, humans or states, respect 
one another as moral equals (not simply as legal or nominal equals); or that each agent 
views the other as an end rather than as a means towards some ulterior end. In sum, 
even a theory centred on the notion of legal rules—as the doctrine of rule-based 
positivism pursued in this essay—ends up investigating serious moral issues.   
While the conceptual sketch of international order proposed here focuses 
attention where it properly belongs—on ideas such as rules, morality, authority, and 
international law—it does not claim to have supplied a full account of the rule-
governed conduct of states. To complete the task additional investigations have to be 
undertaken, notably in areas addressing the problem of rule change and the social 
context of rules. The need for such sociological and constructivist studies has already 
been recognised,
101 and in relation to which this essay figures as a preliminary 




                                                 
99 Hart, The Concept of Law, p. 197.  
100 The legal, moral, and political implications of the distinction between empire and international 
society have more recently been explored by Jean L. Cohen, ‘Whose Sovereignty? Empire Versus 
International Law?’, Ethics and International Affairs, vol. 18, no. 3 (2004), pp. 1-24.  
101 See Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Introduction’, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of 
International Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 1-10.  
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Conclusion  
 
This paper laid out the preliminary postulates of a theory of international order. It 
began by defining the problem of order in terms consistent with traditional legal 
positivism, as an opposition between equality and authority. It registered the paradox 
of international society, as an example where legal equals coexist, while recognising 
common authority. And whereas in domestic politics authority is granted priority over 
equality, the reverse is typically the case in international politics. The challenge for 
the student of international relations, for the most part, is to articulate international 
authority.  
  The idea of sovereignty, or the canonical way for defining authority in 
political theory, was used as a foil to problematise the concept of international 
authority. As the critique of Schmitt showed, sovereign authority is a serious issue 
even for domestic politics. It cannot be otherwise since it regulates the right to life and 
death in a political community. Authority, as the preceding pages argued, can be an 
organising concept for both the domestic and the international order. But to defend 
this proposition, it was requisite to distinguish authority from power, and authority 
(sovereignty) as a principle from the idea of an author (sovereign) as an individual. 
Once these distinctions were in place, it became clear that equality and authority 
collide when the source of authority is taken to be the ensemble of states themselves. 
The equality-authority tension disappears when it is acknowledged that authority does 
not stem from an author—a single or a collective sovereign—but from the rules to 
which agents (states) subscribe. The locus of international order is the international 
society itself, as a corpus of legal rules: this is the message of rule-based positivism 
this exposition sought to defend. But besides reconciling equality with authority, an 
adequate theory of international order has to be sensitive to the requirements of 
justice: the legal rules of such an order in short have to posses the character of 
genuine moral rules.  
  25